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I.  INTRODUCTION 
   When the Supreme Court announced its decision in National Federation 
of Independent Business v. Sebelius,1 most media attention focused on 
the Court upholding the constitutionality of the “individual mandate” of 
the Affordable Care Act.2  However, this decision also struck down a 
provision of the Act relating to Medicaid expansion.  The Court held that 
this provision was an unconstitutional application of Congress’s spending 
power because the provision threatened any state with the loss of all 
federal funds under Medicaid if that state did not “comply with the Act’s 
new coverage requirements.”3  Noting that “Medicaid spending accounts 
for over 20 percent of the average State’s total budget, with federal funds 
covering 50 to 83 percent of those costs,”4 the Court held that this threat 
amounted to “coercion” and was therefore an unconstitutional application of 
Congress’s spending power.5 
   This decision seems to open up many new challenges to federal programs 
that include congressional requirements imposed on states, requirements 
that are incentivized via Congress’s spending power.  Such programs 
include the Clean Air Act, the No Child Left Behind Act, the Elementary 
and Secondary Education Act of 1965, and the Family Educational Rights 
and Privacy Act of 1974.6  Brian Galle states that Sebelius is “a deliberate 
invitation to litigation” by states that might challenge these federal 
programs.7  Neal Katyal writes that “[t]he fancy footwork that the court 
1. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
2. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat.
119 (2010) (to be codified as amended at scattered sections of 26 and 42 U.S.C.) [hereinafter 
Affordable Care Act]. 
3.  Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2582, 2608.
4.  Id. at 2604.
5.  Id. at 2608.
6.  See J. Lester Feder & Darren Samuelsohn, The Medicaid Ruling’s Ripple
Effect, POLITICO (July 3, 2012, 11:59 AM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0712/ 
78091.html. 
7.  Alan Greenblatt, Court Gives States Ammunition in Health Care Battle, NPR
(July 9, 2012), http://m.npr.org/news/U.S./156466010?singlePage=true (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
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employed to view the act as coercive could come back in later cases to 
haunt the federal government.”8 
   Thus, this opinion may also present a challenge to the viability of 
“optimal federalism.”9  Optimal federalism is an analytical technique for 
determining the appropriate level of government for carrying out different 
functions of a public policy.10  It is related to “cooperative federalism,” 
which suggests that better policy outcomes may be achieved through the 
cooperation of different levels of government.11  The difference is that 
optimal federalism is a structured approach to determine the optimal 
division of labor between levels of government. 
   The optimal federalism technique divides the functions of public policy 
into enactment, implementation, and enforcement stages and then 
analyzes economies and diseconomies of scale for each stage.12  By 
comparing economies and diseconomies of scale, the optimal federalism 
technique enables the identification of the appropriate level of government 
for carrying out each stage of a policy.  This technique has been used to 
identify the optimal combination of governmental efforts to address 
environmental, health care, and immigration policies.13  In many instances, 
the optimal combination includes federal enactment along with state and 
local implementation and enforcement.  The use of these optimal 
combinations allows flexible approaches to difficult policy problems, 
rewards innovation, and maintains respect for local choices, while also 
providing an effective governmental response to market failures at the 
lowest possible cost. 
   Although Congress cannot directly “commandeer”14 state and local 
governments to implement and enforce its directives, in the past, Congress 
8. Neal K. Katyal, A Pyrrhic Victory, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2012, at A25.
9. For more on optimal federalism, see generally Dale B. Thompson, Optimal
Federalism Across Institutions: Theory and Applications from Environmental and 
Health Care Policies, 40 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 437 (2009). 
10.  See, e.g., id. at 439–40.
11. For more on cooperative federalism, see generally Joshua D. Sarnoff, Cooperative 
Federalism, the Delegation of Federal Power, and the Constitution, 39 ARIZ. L. REV.
205 (1997). 
12.  See Thompson, supra note 9, at 439–40.
13.  See Dale B. Thompson, Immigration Policy Through the Lens of Optimal
Federalism, 2 WM. & MARY POL’Y REV. 236, 237–38 (2011); Thompson, supra note 9, 
at 437–38. 
14. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161 (1992) (quoting Hodel v.
Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1991)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  Some have argued that the federal government should be able 
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has been able to design certain incentives to induce state and local 
governments to carry out the directives contained in federal legislation.15  
For example, in the Clean Water Act, Congress empowered the Federal 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to set up its own water 
effluent-permitting program for states that have not created their own 
EPA-approved implementation program.16  This threat of external 
regulation provides a strong incentive for states to create their own 
water permitting program.17  Congress has more frequently used its 
constitutional power under the Spending Clause18 to attach strings to 
federal grants to states.  These strings are conditions on the receipt of 
federal funds, where the conditions apply specific incentives to have the 
states implement and enforce directives contained in federal legislation. 
As noted above, Congress has used this approach across a wide variety 
of legislation, including environmental programs,19 educational programs, 
highway administration programs,20 and social programs.21  The use of 
these incentives thereby enables Congress to capture the benefits of an 
optimal federalism approach when appropriate. 
   However, if the rationale of Sebelius can be extended to threaten these 
conditional grants, as suggested by recent commentary,22 then not only are 
these particular federal programs threatened but also the whole concept of 
optimal federalism may be unworkable.  Without the tool of conditional 
strings on federal grants, Congress will be limited in its ability to utilize 
to commandeer state officers.  See discussion infra Part II.C.  However, this Article does 
not address this broader issue; instead it focuses on the coercion limitation on the 
spending power. 
15. Sometimes labeled “sticks” and “carrots.”  See Evan H. Caminker, State
Sovereignty and Subordinacy: May Congress Commandeer State Officers To Implement 
Federal Law?, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1020 (1995); Brian Galle, The Tragedy of the 
Carrots: Economics and Politics in the Choice of Price Instruments, 64 STAN. L. REV. 
797, 797 (2012). 
16. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 (Clean Air Act),
Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 
(2006)).  For more on the Clean Air Act, see generally Dale B. Thompson, Beyond 
Benefit-Cost Analysis: Institutional Transaction Costs and Regulation of Water Quality, 
39 NAT. RESOURCES J. 517 (1999). 
17. A similar mechanism with respect to Social Security was the subject of the
Court’s decision in Steward Machine Co. v. Davis.  See 301 U.S. 548, 573–78 (1937). 
18.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
19. Such programs include the Clean Air Act.
20.  See Greenblatt, supra note 7.
21.  See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991) (addressing family planning
services, “[t]he Government can, without violating the Constitution, selectively fund a 
program to encourage certain activities it believes to be in the public interest”); South 
Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 205 (1987) (addressing the drinking age). 
22.  See, e.g., Katyal, supra note 8; Feder & Samuelsohn, supra note 6; Greenblatt,
supra note 7. 
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state and local governmental resources to implement and enforce policies. 
The question that needs to be answered then is this: should the Court’s 
finding of “coercion” in the Affordable Care Act’s Medicaid provision be 
extended to other situations; that is, how slippery is the slope of coercion? 
   This Article finds that the Court’s opinion in Sebelius acts as a reasonable 
judicial check on the power of the legislature.  The level of the penalty 
on the states imposed by the Medicaid provision was so high that it was 
quite likely that this provision could diminish general welfare and yet still 
be put into effect.  As a result, such a provision would be inconsistent with 
the principles of optimal federalism.  On the other hand, principles of 
judicial deference, the role of the judiciary, and pragmatic and efficiency 
reasons all suggest that the reach of the “coercion” defense to the 
enforcement of congressional spending power conditions should be 
limited. 
   Utilizing the language of the joint dissent23 in Sebelius, this Article 
suggests that a new, more deferential tier of scrutiny should be applied 
to judicial review of congressional authority under the Spending Clause: 
a condition would be unconstitutional only if it is “unmistakably clear”24 
that it is coercive.  With this significantly deferential standard, Congress 
would continue to have the power, in most situations, to utilize conditional 
strings on federal grants to achieve national policy goals.  With this ability, 
Congress then should continue to search for opportunities to utilize the 
optimal federalism technique to achieve national objectives in a flexible, 
innovative, respectful, and low-cost manner. 
   The rest of this Article is as follows.  Part II describes the debate over 
the Spending Clause across the Federalist Papers, the U.S. Supreme Court 
in the twentieth century, and scholarly reactions to the Court’s decisions. 
Part III examines the Court’s decision in Sebelius.  Part IV argues that, 
although judicial review of the spending power is necessary, it should be 
limited, and this Part proposes and explains a new, more deferential tier 
of scrutiny—unmistakable clarity.  Part V concludes by urging future 
courts not to overextend the application of coercion to spending power 
review and suggests that proper deference can be shown by using the 
new unmistakably clear standard. 
23. The joint dissent opinion was written by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas,
and Alito.  Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2642 (2012). 
24.  Id. at 2662 (emphasis added).
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II. THE DEBATE OVER COERCION AND THE SPENDING
CLAUSE UP UNTIL SEBELIUS 
   There has been a long debate over the Spending Clause.  After beginning 
in the Federalist Papers, this debate was renewed in the Supreme Court 
during the first half of the twentieth century.  A new focus was given to 
this debate during the Rehnquist Court, causing legal scholars to 
scrutinize it closely. 
A.  The Debate Among the Authors of the Federalist Papers and the 
Supreme Court’s Take on This Debate 
   The debate over the extent of the spending power of the federal 
government begins at the start with a debate between James Madison 
and Alexander Hamilton.25  In Federalist No. 41, Madison argued that 
the spending power of the federal government extended only to those 
powers already enumerated in the Constitution.26  On the other hand, 
Hamilton argued that the power to spend extended beyond those 
enumerated powers, as long as the spending was done to improve the 
general welfare.27 
   This debate was carried forward into the Supreme Court during the 
early twentieth century.  In United States v. Butler,28 the Court claimed 
to adopt the Hamiltonian view29 but nonetheless declared that the 
25.  The spending power comes from the Taxing and Spending Clause: “The
Congress shall have the Power To lay and collect Taxes . . . to pay the Debts and provide 
for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States . . . .”  U.S. CONST. 
art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
26.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 41 (James Madison) (1788) (stating that the argument
“that the power ‘to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, to pay the debts, 
and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States,’ amounts 
to an unlimited commission to exercise every power which may be alleged to be 
necessary for the common defense or general welfare” was a “misconstruction”). 
27.  See ALEXANDER HAMILTON, FINAL VERSION OF THE REPORT ON THE SUBJECT
OF MANUFACTURES (1791), reprinted in 10 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 230, 
303 (Harold C. Syrett et al. eds., 1966), quoted in David E. Engdahl, The Spending 
Power, 44 DUKE L.J. 1, 22 n.71 (1994); see also United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65–
66 (1935) (“Hamilton, on the other hand, maintained the clause confers a power separate 
and distinct from those later enumerated, is not restricted in meaning by the grant of 
them, and Congress consequently has a substantive power to tax and to appropriate, limited 
only by the requirement that it shall be exercised to provide for the general welfare of the 
United States.”). 
28. 297 U.S. at 1.  The spending power was challenged by an earlier case, but
rather than addressing the substantive argument on the spending power, the Court ruled 
on the basis of lack of jurisdiction.  Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 478–80 
(1923). 
29.  Butler, 297 U.S. at 65–66.
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Agricultural Adjustment Act of 193330 was unconstitutional.31  Justice 
Roberts, writing for the Court, held that the Act was “a statutory plan to 
regulate and control agricultural production, a matter beyond the powers 
delegated to the federal government.  The tax, the appropriation of the 
funds raised, and the direction for their disbursement, are but parts of the 
plan.  They are but means to an unconstitutional end.”32  Despite the 
Court’s claim that the Hamiltonian view was “correct,” this reasoning 
adopted the Madisonian view.33  The Court also invalidated the Act because 
it found that the Act could not be saved as an exercise of power where 
the “end is accomplished by voluntary co-operation.”34  The Court 
concluded that this Act was unlawful because it amounted to “coercion,” 
with the Court noting that the “power to confer or withhold unlimited 
benefits is the power to coerce or destroy.”35 
   This apparent win for the Madisonian view of the spending power was 
quickly set aside with two cases announced less than seventeen months 
later: Steward Machine Co. v. Davis and Helvering v. Davis.36  In these 
cases, Justice Cardozo, writing for the Court, noted, “[t]he conception of 
the spending power advocated by Hamilton and strongly reinforced by 
Story has prevailed over that of Madison, which has not been lacking 
in adherents.”37  Based on this, in both cases, the Court upheld the 
constitutionality of the Social Security Act of 1935, finding that the Act 
was a valid exercise of the spending power for the general welfare.38  
Ten years later, in Oklahoma v. United States Civil Service Commission, 
the Court followed the same reasoning, upholding the constitutionality 
of the Hatch Act, which included a condition on the management of state 
political officials in order to receive federal highway funds.39 
30. Pub. L. No. 73-10, 48 Stat. 31.
31.  Butler, 297 U.S. at 68.
32.  Id.
33.  See Engdahl, supra note 27, at 36–38.
34.  Butler, 297 U.S. at 70.
35.  Id. at 71.
36. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937); Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S.
619 (1937). 
37.  Helvering, 301 U.S. at 640.
38.  Steward Mach. Co., 301 U.S. at 573–77, 598; Helvering, 301 U.S. at 634–39, 646. 
39. Oklahoma v. United States Civil Serv. Comm’n, 330 U.S. 127, 143 (1947)
(“While the United States is not concerned with, and has no power to regulate, local 
political activities as such of state officials, it does have power to fix the terms upon 
which its money allotments to states shall be disbursed.”). 
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B.  The Debate Renewed During the Rehnquist Court 
   In 1987, the Court returned to the spending power in South Dakota v. 
Dole.40  In this case, South Dakota challenged the constitutionality of a 
condition on the receipt of federal highway funds that penalized states 
that had a minimum drinking age below twenty-one.41  Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, writing for the Court, again adopted the Hamiltonian view, 
holding that “objectives not thought to be within Article I’s ‘enumerated 
legislative fields’ may nevertheless be attained through the use of the 
spending power and the conditional grant of federal funds.”42  Still, though, 
the Court did note that “[t]he spending power is of course not unlimited” 
and then described four stated restrictions on the spending power.43  
These restrictions were that (1) the spending must be for the benefit of 
the general welfare; (2) the condition must be a “clear statement”44 to 
allow the state to know what it is agreeing to; (3) the condition should be 
related to some federal policy interest; and (4) the condition must not 
require unconstitutional activities.45 
   After stating these specific restrictions, Rehnquist returned to the issue 
of coercion that supported the Butler opinion.  Rehnquist noted that in 
“some circumstances the financial inducement offered by Congress 
might be so coercive as to pass the point at which ‘pressure turns into 
compulsion.’”46  In Dole, if South Dakota failed to comply with the national 
minimum drinking age, then it could lose “5% of the funds otherwise 
obtainable under specified highway grant programs.”47  Not wanting “to 
hold that motive or temptation is equivalent to coercion [because that 
would] plunge the law in endless difficulties,” the Court instead concluded 
that this penalty was not coercion but rather a “relatively mild encouragement 
to the States to enact higher minimum drinking ages than they would 
otherwise choose.”48 
40. 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
41.  Id. at 205.
42.  Id. at 207 (quoting United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65 (1936)) (citation
omitted). 
43.  Id. at 207–08.
44. This rule “holds that courts may enforce against states the conditions of a
federal grant only if those conditions are stated ‘unambiguously’ in the statute.”  Brian 
Galle, Federal Grants, State Decisions, 88 B.U. L. REV. 875, 878 (2008) (citing Barnes 
v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 186 (2002); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 465–67 (1991);
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981)). 
45.  See Dole, 483 U.S. at 207–08.
46.  Id. at 211 (quoting Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)).
47.  Id.
48.  Id. (quoting Steward Mach. Co., 301 U.S. at 589–90) (internal quotation marks
omitted). 
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   After Dole, the Court again addressed the issue of the spending power 
in New York v. United States.49  In this case, Justice O’Connor, writing 
for the Court, distinguished between the power to regulate and the power 
to attach conditions to grants under the Spending Clause.  The Court 
held that “Congress may not simply ‘commandeer the legislative processes 
of the States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal 
regulatory program.’”50  Although Congress cannot do this directly, the 
Court held that it could use conditional grants to achieve the same 
results, as long as the grants were not coercive.51  The Court also held 
that these particular grants were not coercive because the states did have 
some choice: “That the States are able to choose whether they will 
receive federal funds does not make the resulting expenditures any less 
federal; indeed, the location of such choice in the States is an inherent 
element in any conditional exercise of Congress’ spending power.”52  
The Court announced its prohibition against commandeering by the 
federal government again a few years later in Printz v. United States,53 
as Justice Scalia wrote that it was “clear that the Federal Government 
may not compel the States to implement, by legislation or executive 
action, federal regulatory programs.”54 
C.  Legal Scholars’ Responses to the Supreme Court 
Jurisprudence on This Debate 
   As can be expected, legal scholars’ responses to this jurisprudence 
have been varied.  Some have argued that the anticommandeering 
proscription should be abandoned, thereby enabling Congress to fully 
utilize state resources to carry out federal programs.  Others have argued 
that Congress should not be able to utilize even the spending power in 
order to induce states to regulate for the general welfare, while others 
have disputed their conclusions.  Still others have suggested that the 
Court should modify the limitations laid down by the Dole Court. 
49. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
50.  Id. at 161 (quoting Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452
U.S. 264, 288 (1981)). 
51.  See id. at 172–73.
52.  Id. at 173.
53. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
54.  Id. at 925.
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Meanwhile, most commentators have found the Court’s coercion limitation 
to be unworkable. 
   Evan Caminker argued in 1995 that the Court’s “anti-commandeering 
doctrine [announced in New York v. United States was] unjustified as a 
matter of constitutional law.”55  Caminker found that the Court’s basis for 
its decision was “an unpersuasive originalist argument concerning the 
Framers’ constitutional design.”56  Instead, Caminker pointed to a number 
of justifications for commandeering.  These included using commandeering 
to address negative or positive externalities;57 to “transcend th[e] prisoners’ 
dilemma”58 of a “race-to-the-bottom” situation;59 and to achieve 
“administrative efficiency and efficacy.”60  Commandeering achieves 
this efficiency by “enhanc[ing] the prospect that ministerial enforcement 
decisions will reflect local conditions and concerns” and by “likely 
increas[ing] the extent of citizen compliance, given local respect for and 
proximity to the state enforcement authorities.”61  In the end, Caminker 
finds that a commandeering “approach allows Congress to govern in a 
decentralized manner that is more respectful of state autonomy.”62 
   Around the same time, Lynn Baker argued that the Court should limit 
the spending power by “presum[ing] invalid that subset of offers of 
federal funds to the states which, if accepted, would regulate the states in 
ways that Congress could not directly mandate under its other Article I 
powers.”63  The spending power would remain if the Court could determine 
that “the offer of funds constitutes ‘reimbursement spending’ rather than 
‘regulatory spending’ legislation.”64  The difference between reimbursement 
spending and regulatory spending was that “‘[r]eimbursement spending’ 
legislation specifies the purpose for which the states are to spend the 
offered federal funds and simply reimburses the states, in whole or in 
55.  Caminker, supra note 15, at 1006.  For another critique of New York v. United
States’s anticommandeering doctrine, see Erwin Chemerinsky, Right Result, Wrong Reasons: 
Reno v. Condon, 25 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 823, 824 (2000) (“[I]deally, the Court should 
have overruled these earlier cases, New York v. United States and Printz v. United States, 
and their holding that Congress cannot commandeer state governments.” (footnotes omitted)). 
56.  Caminker, supra note 15, at 1006.
57.  Id. at 1012.
58.  Id. at 1013.
59. A race-to-the-bottom situation is where no individual state wants to act
affirmatively on its own for fear that it will become noncompetitive with another state. 
See, e.g., id. 
60.  Id. at 1014.
61.  Id.
62.  Id. at 1007.
63. Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending After Lopez, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 
1911, 1916 (1995). 
64.  Id.
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part, for their expenditures for that purpose.”65  Baker suggested that this 
distinction was a way to operationalize the Dole Court’s coercion limitation 
on the spending power: the difference between reimbursement and 
regulatory spending is where “mere ‘encouragement’ ends and ‘coercion’ 
begins.”66 
   Baker later argued, with Mitchell Berman, that the Dole Court’s coercion 
limitation, along with its “relatedness” requirement, had been “toothless” 
in its implementation by later courts reviewing conditional spending 
legislation.67  Although Baker and Berman found that “Dole should be 
abandoned,”68 they were concerned with the uncertainty of what a new 
spending power test might look like.69  One alternative that they discussed 
is a redefinition of coercion.  One possible new definition would be that 
the “Court could reconceptualize the coercion prong as providing that a 
spending condition is impermissibly coercive if it presents a state with 
either no rational choice or no fair choice but to accept, even if it leaves 
the state with a practical choice not to.”70  They also suggested that a 
more workable coercion test could come from 
adopt[ing] a different sense of coercion than that featured in Dole—a sense 
that turns not on how onerous it would be for state offerees if Congress carried 
out its threat to withhold federal funds but on whether carrying out the threat 
would be wrongful in character because animated by the wrong sorts of reasons.71 
   These conclusions have been criticized by some scholars.  Brian Galle 
pointed out that Baker’s assumptions about taxes may not be entirely 
accurate72 and also pointed out that Baker’s “solution of aggressive 
judicial enforcement of limits on the Spending Clause” could introduce 
65.  Id. at 1963.
66.  Id. at 1973.
67. Lynn A. Baker & Mitchell N. Berman, Getting Off the Dole: Why the Court
Should Abandon Its Spending Doctrine, and How a Too-Clever Congress Could Provoke 
It To Do So, 78 IND. L.J. 459, 466 (2003). 
68.  Id. at 461.
69.  See id. at 541.
70.  Id. at 520–21 (emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted).
71.  Id. at 539.
72.  See Brian Galle, Getting Spending: How To Replace Clear Statement Rules
with Clear Thinking About Conditional Grants of Federal Funds, 37 CONN. L. REV. 155, 
189–91 (2004); see also Galle, supra note 44, at 881 (explaining that “the available 
economic data belie, or at best do not support the claims that state officials will fail to 
preserve diversity, or that federal grants wrongly obscure official accountability.  As a 
result, I maintain that decisions applying the clear statement rule, as well as more direct 
limits on conditional spending, are hard to defend.”). 
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“substantial” “error costs” associated with “the familiar perils of an 
unelected judiciary rejecting duly enacted legislation based on its own 
theory of what the Constitution demands.”73  Instead of finding evidence 
of coercion,74 Galle concluded that the “use of the Spending Clause 
restricts the degree to which state preferences can be displaced by the 
federal government, whether by drastically increasing the support needed 
for a given piece of legislation, or simply by diminishing the size of the 
federal government as a whole.”75  Also, while noting the difficulty in 
determining a baseline upon which to judge coercion, Samuel Bagenstos 
noted that the coercion concepts offered by Baker and Berman were, 
even to Baker and Berman themselves, “just too amorphous to be judicially 
administrable.”76 
   In a later article, Brian Galle also suggested that the “clear statement 
rule” limiting the spending power should be dropped.77  In doing so, he 
challenged the notion that state officials face complete fiscal constraints 
in the face of federal conditional spending.  If a state’s “own-revenue 
capacity is an independent check on federal expansion by means of 
conditional spending,” this capacity also reduced the possibility that a 
federal condition is coercive.78 
   On the other hand, Thomas Merrill argued that the “clear statement 
strategy prescribes a much more constructive and workable role for the 
courts in determining the balance between stability and change in the 
assignment of powers between the federal government and the States.”79  
Merrill differentiated between “clear statement” and “prohibitory strateg[ies]” 
as “limitations on legislative power,” as being the distinction between a 
“collaborative” versus a “unilateral” approach.80  He explained that the 
appropriate approach depends on the type of “factual determination[]” 
being undertaken by the court: 
There is a strong tradition in American public law that politically accountable 
bodies should be the primary determiners of legislative facts, and politically 
insulated courts should be the primary determiners of adjudicative facts.  This 
is based in part on assumptions about the comparative competencies of legislatures 
and courts, and in part on considerations of legitimacy. . . .  The Court has always 
73.  Galle, supra note 72, at 197, 198.
74.  See id. at 190.
75.  Id. at 188.
76. Samuel R. Bagenstos, Spending Clause Litigation in the Roberts Court, 58
DUKE L.J. 345, 374 (2008) (quoting Baker & Berman, supra note 67, at 521) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
77.  Galle, supra note 44, at 934.
78.  Id. at 881.
79. Thomas W. Merrill, Rescuing Federalism After Raich: The Case for Clear
Statement Rules, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 823, 826 (2005). 
80.  Id. at 827.
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deferred to Congress in making such predictions [about predicting future behavior 
based on legislative changes].  The clear statement strategy comfortably 
accommodates such deference by asking whether Congress made the appropriate 
legislative findings.  The prohibitory strategy does not, since it is unclear what 
standard of review courts should apply to legislative findings under this approach, 
and there is always the temptation to substitute judicial for legislative fact 
finding.81 
Merrill’s argument was that the relative competency of courts as opposed to 
legislatures suggests that a court’s review of legislative power should 
focus more on reviewing process rather than drawing its own conclusions as 
a substitute for legislative fact-finding. 
  Regardless, one thing that most legal scholars agreed upon in this 
debate was the intractability and ineffectiveness of applying a coercion 
test.  In her seminal article, Unconstitutional Conditions, Kathleen Sullivan 
explained many of these difficulties.82  She writes that “deciding under 
what circumstances government offers, like private offers, are coercive 
is an inevitably normative inquiry.”83  When courts try to conduct this 
inquiry, “[c]onclusory labels often take the place of analysis—for example, 
conditioned benefits are frequently deemed ‘penalties’ when struck down 
and ‘nonsubsidies’ when upheld.”84  As a result, “[n]either the Court nor 
the commentary, however, has developed a satisfying theory of what is 
coercive about unconstitutional conditions.”85 
  Also, as noted above, Baker and Berman had found that courts’ 
application of the coercion test had been “toothless.”86  Meanwhile, 
Bagenstos also pointed to the difficulties in determining baselines: 
[I]t is easy to see why the coercion doctrine has proven ineffective as a limit on 
Congress’s power to attach conditions to grants of federal funds to states.  The 
basic problem is well rehearsed in the literature: Determinations that a 
conditional offer of federal funds coerces the states tend to depend on normatively 
contestable premises about states’ baseline entitlement to federal largesse.87 
81.  Id. at 830 (footnoted omitted).
82. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413
(1989). 
83.  Id. at 1420.
84.  Id.
85.  Id.
86. Baker & Berman, supra note 67, at 485.
87.  Bagenstos, supra note 76, at 372–73.
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The problem with applying the coercion test, as Bagenstos suggests, was 
that it would be rare to find a situation in which a consensual baseline 
can be agreed upon.  Nonetheless, that is exactly what the Court found in 
Sebelius. 
III. THE COURT’S OPINION CONCERNING THE SPENDING
CLAUSE IN SEBELIUS 
   In Sebelius, the Court addressed whether the “Medicaid expansion [in 
the Affordable Care Act] exceeds Congress’s authority under the 
Spending Clause.”88  Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts held 
that “the Medicaid expansion . . . portion of the Affordable Care Act 
violates the Constitution by threatening existing Medicaid funding.”89  To 
reach this conclusion, Roberts balanced a respect for congressional 
authority under the Spending Clause with a concern over the excessive 
Medicaid condition imposed on states by the Affordable Care Act. 
   Chief Justice Roberts began the opinion with a recounting of basic 
judicial review principles.  In reviewing the Spending Clause, Roberts 
explained that “Congress may offer funds to the States, and may condition 
those offers on compliance with specified conditions.”90  More importantly, 
“[t]hese offers may well induce the States to adopt policies that the Federal 
Government itself could not impose.”91  Roberts further notes that the 
Necessary and Proper Clause92 extends this power even more: “We have 
long read this provision to give Congress great latitude in exercising its 
powers . . . .”93  Judicial deference to Congress is further supported by “a 
general reticence to invalidate the acts of the Nation’s elected leaders.”94 
The reason for this deference is because “[m]embers of this Court are 
vested with the authority to interpret the law; [they] possess neither the 
expertise nor the prerogative to make policy judgments.”95 
   This deference is also noted in the dissent in part of Justice Ginsburg: 
“This Court, time and again, has respected Congress’ prescription of 
88. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2601 (2012).
89.  Id. at 2608.
90.  Id. at 2579; see also id. at 2601 (“We have long recognized that Congress may
use this power to grant federal funds to the States, and may condition such a grant upon 
the States’ ‘taking certain actions that Congress could not require them to take.’” 
(quoting Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 
666, 686 (1999))). 
91.  Id. at 2579.
92.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
93.  Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2579.
94.  Id.
95.  Id.
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spending conditions, and has required States to abide by them.”96  The 
joint “dissent”97 of Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito likewise 
reflects this deference: “The power to make any expenditure that furthers 
‘the general welfare’ is obviously very broad, and shortly after Butler 
was decided the Court gave Congress wide leeway to decide whether an 
expenditure qualifies.”98  Thus, each of the opinions in this case clearly 
indicates the great deference given by the Court to congressional acts 
under the Spending Clause. 
   On the other hand, there are limits to this deference.  Drawing from a 
comparison to contracts and an argument about political accountability, 
Chief Justice Roberts explained that Congress cannot “commandeer[] a 
State’s legislative or administrative apparatus for federal purposes.”99  
A further limit is reached “when ‘pressure turns into compulsion’” 
or coercion.100  Although courts have struggled to find coercion in previous 
cases, Roberts agreed with the contention that this case was “far from the 
typical case,” so far “that Congress has ‘crossed the line distinguishing 
encouragement from coercion.’”101 
   Chief Justice Roberts’s analysis of coercion examined two key factors: 
(1) the identification of an identifiable, legitimate baseline and (2) the 
degree of the threat imposed by the Medicaid condition.  As noted 
above, the difficulty in identifying a legitimate baseline is a frequent 
barrier to finding coercion.  However, the particular situation presented 
by the Affordable Care Act provided a relatively clear baseline: Medicaid 
grants to states not connected with the expansion in Medicaid services 
called for under the Act.  Roberts began with a general proposition: “When 
. . . such conditions [on the receipt of federal funds] take the form of 
threats to terminate other significant independent grants, the conditions are 
properly viewed as a means of pressuring the States to accept policy 
changes.”102  With this proposition, Roberts laid the foundation to argue 
96.  Id. at 2633 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v.
Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981)). 
97. Note that for the Medicaid aspect of the decision, the joint “dissent” concurred
with the finding of the Roberts opinion.  See id. at 2666–67 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
98.  Id. at 2658 (citing Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640–41 (1937)).
99.  Id. at 2602 (majority opinion) (citing Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898,
933 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 174–75 (1992)). 
 100.  Id. (quoting Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)). 
 101.  Id. at 2603 (quoting New York, 505 U.S. at 175). 
 102.  Id. at 2604. 
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that a threat to terminate a state’s entire Medicaid reimbursement, which 
he will view as an “independent grant,” is a coercive act. 
   Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in part pointed out that it is a single program 
that we are examining: Medicaid.103  Ginsburg noted that there have been 
“past expansions, plus express statutory warning that Congress may change 
the requirements participating States must meet.”104  Congress reserved 
the right to modify the conditions for receiving Medicaid funding in the 
original Social Security Act legislation.  As a result, “[s]tates have no 
entitlement to receive any Medicaid funds; they enjoy only the opportunity 
to accept funds on Congress’ terms.”105  When Congress enacted the 
Affordable Care Act with the condition that states must expand Medicaid 
or risk losing all Medicaid funds, it was “simply requiring States to do what 
States have long been required to do to receive Medicaid funding: comply 
with the conditions Congress prescribes for participation.”106 
   However, Roberts then explained that, in the Medicaid expansion in 
the Affordable Care Act, the different target populations, different 
reimbursement rates, and different coverage levels “accomplish[] a shift 
in kind, not merely degree.”107  With such significant changes of degree and 
kind, a “State could hardly anticipate that Congress’s reservation of the 
right to ‘alter’ or ‘amend’ the Medicaid program included the power to 
transform it so dramatically.”108  The effect then is that “the expansion is 
in reality a new program and that Congress is forcing [the states] to accept it 
by threatening the funds for the[ir] existing Medicaid program[s].”109 
   What Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Ginsburg argued here is this: 
what is the proper baseline for comparison for determining whether a 
condition is coercive?  The baseline determines the preexisting state of 
entitlements.  The equity of any condition depends upon whether the 
condition respects the preexisting state of entitlements, where one party 
may choose to surrender some portion of the entitlement in exchange for 
something to which the party was not previously entitled to, or whether 
the condition attempts to deprive the individual of some portion of 
the entitlement without sufficient compensation.  A parable that this 
Author read as an undergraduate student illustrates this difference well: 
 103.  Id. at 2630 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Medicaid, as amended by the ACA, 
however, is not two spending programs; it is a single program with a constant aim—to 
enable poor persons to receive basic health care when they need it.”). 
 104.  Id. 
 105.  Id. 
 106.  Id. 
 107.  Id. at 2605 (majority opinion). 
 108.  Id. at 2606. 
 109.  Id. at 2605. 
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A wealthy man is in a snake pit, and is about to die.  Above the snake pit is a 
woman with a ladder.  She knows that the man in the pit has a wealth of one 
million dollars, and so she offers to sell the ladder to the man for one million 
dollars.  The man accepts, and climbs out of the snake pit, alive.  Was this a fair 
trade?  What if I told you that the woman pushed the man into the snake pit?110 
   In the end, the fairness of the expansion condition depends critically 
upon whether Congress truly has the right to threaten states with the 
complete loss of all Medicaid funding.  If it is accurate to say that each 
year a state should not expect to receive any funding unless it meets that 
year’s conditions, then the state of the entitlement is truly fluid and the 
Affordable Care Act’s Medicaid condition would be fair.  However, if 
the mutually agreed upon expectations are that each year a state would 
carry out an adapted implementation of the Medicaid program and also 
that each state would be reimbursed for a portion of its program by the 
federal government, then the Medicaid condition would be an unfair act 
because it would threaten the state with the deprivation of a portion of its 
mutually agreed upon entitlement without sufficient compensation.  The 
question then becomes, which of these two situations is present in this 
case?  The answer is inextricably connected to the second key coercion 
factor addressed by Chief Justice Roberts: the degree of the threat imposed 
by the Medicaid condition. 
   Chief Justice Roberts used both statistics and colorful language to 
demonstrate how extreme the Medicaid condition threat is.  Roberts noted 
that “Medicaid spending accounts for over 20 percent of the average State’s 
total budget, with federal funds covering 50 to 83 percent of those costs.”111 
Roberts then illustrated how different this case is from the situation in 
Dole.  In Dole, the effect of the condition was a “threatened loss of less 
than half of one percent of South Dakota’s budget.”112  In such a case, 
South Dakota had “a ‘prerogative’ to reject Congress’s desired policy, ‘not 
merely in theory but in fact.’”113  On the other hand, the effect of the 
Medicaid expansion condition in the Affordable Care Act was the 
“threatened loss of over 10 percent of a State’s overall budget.”114  By 
 110.  The Author has tried but has not yet identified the original source of this parable.  
For a similar parable, see Joseph William Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 
STAN. L. REV. 611, 648–49 (1988). 
 111.  Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2604. 
 112.  Id. 
 113.  Id. at 2605 (quoting South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211–12 (1987)). 
 114.  Id. 
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comparison then, the Medicaid expansion condition “is economic 
dragooning that leaves the States with no real option but to acquiesce.”115  
In addition to calling this condition “dragooning,” Chief Justice Roberts 
colorfully explained that the Medicaid expansion condition “is much more 
than ‘relatively mild encouragement’—it is a gun to the head.”116 
   The extreme nature of this condition was also highlighted by the joint 
dissenters.  They noted that “Medicaid has long been the largest federal 
program of grants to the States”117 and that the “States devote a larger 
percentage of their budgets to Medicaid than to any other item.”118  They 
then provided an even more specific comparison, pointing out the 
differences in amounts for the State of South Dakota between the condition 
in this case and the condition in Dole.  Whereas the Dole condition 
threatened South Dakota with the loss of “approximately $614.7 million—
or about 0.19% of all [its] state expenditures combined,” the threat in 
this case amounts to “federal funding equaling 28.9% of its annual state 
expenditures.”119  As a result, the dissent concluded that, although the Dole 
condition was “aptly characterized as ‘relatively mild encouragement,’” the 
Medicaid expansion condition “is a different matter.”120  With a difference 
of two orders of magnitude, the joint dissenters found that the “dimensions 
of the Medicaid program lend strong support to the petitioner States’ 
argument that refusing to accede to the conditions set out in the ACA is 
not a realistic option.”121 
   It is precisely here then that the two key factors—the baseline and the 
extreme nature of the condition—intersect.  Although it might seem 
theoretically possible that Congress could “‘repeal’ Medicaid, wiping it 
out entirely,”122 practically it cannot—at least not overnight.  The extent 
of the reach of Medicaid, both in terms of its fiscal percentages and the 
populations it services, makes this program self-perpetuating, with Congress 
unwilling to end it.  It is yet another institution that is too big to fail. 
Meanwhile, the fiscal and political impact of a state ending its participation 
in Medicaid would likewise imply that no state could ever choose to 
terminate its receipt of Medicaid funding.123  As the joint dissenters 
 115.  Id. 
 116.  Id. at 2604. 
 117.  Id. at 2662 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 118.  Id. at 2663. 
 119.  Id. at 2664. 
 120.  Id. 
 121.  Id. at 2662. 
 122.  Id. at 2639 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
123.  It should be noted that for some time in the beginning, Arizona held and did 
not participate in Medicaid—until 1982.  Charles Brecher, Medicaid Comes to Arizona: 
A First-Year Report on AHCCCS, 9 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 411, 411 (1984). 
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suggested, “Congress never dreamed that any State would refuse to go 
along with the expansion of Medicaid.  Congress well understood that 
refusal was not a practical option.”124  As a result of the consistency of both 
sides’ expectations, the proper baseline for this situation is one in which 
the federal government would continue to grant funding for Medicaid 
reimbursement. 
   In reaching this conclusion, we see how the two factors are inherently 
tied together.  In order to establish the mutually agreed upon baseline, 
we must refer to the extreme nature of the impact of “wiping out” Medicaid 
to show how neither Congress nor the states would contemplate doing 
that.  At the same time though, characterizing the effect as extreme itself 
depends upon the identification of a baseline, namely extreme compared 
with what?  Because these two factors are mutually dependent, it means 
that the line—between what is coercive and what is not—is not in a 
fixed place.  A line is there, but its nature makes it difficult to determine 
precisely where it lies. 
   Each member of the Court recognized this difficulty in perceiving 
exactly where the line between coercion and noncoercion lies.  As he 
concluded his analysis, finding that the Medicaid expansion condition is 
coercive, Chief Justice Roberts recalled that the “Court in Steward Machine 
did not attempt to ‘fix the outermost line’ where persuasion gives way to 
coercion.  The Court found it ‘enough for present purposes that wherever 
the line may be, this statute is within it.’”125  Here, Roberts likewise did 
not attempt to specify where this line lies: “We have no need to fix a line 
either.  It is enough for today that wherever that line may be, this statute 
is surely beyond it.”126  In a similar theme, Justice Ginsburg asked, “How is 
a court to judge whether ‘only 6.6% of all state expenditures’ is an amount 
States could or would do without?”127  Ginsburg wonders, “[H]ow will 
litigants and judges assess whether ‘a State has a legitimate choice whether 
to accept the federal conditions in exchange for federal funds?’”128  
However, this was before Arizona ever received any Medicaid funding.  It is much more 
difficult to refuse after local institutional arrangements have arisen to utilize available 
Medicaid funds. 
 124.  Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2665 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 125.  Id. at 2606 (majority opinion) (citation omitted) (quoting Steward Mach. Co. 
v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 591 (1937)).
126.  Id.
127.  Id. at 2640 n.24 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (quoting id. at
2663 (Scalia, J., dissenting)). 
 128.  Id. (quoting id. at 2602 (majority opinion)). 
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Moreover, the joint dissent also recognized this difficulty: “Whether federal 
spending legislation crosses the line from enticement to coercion is often 
difficult to determine, and courts should not conclude that legislation is 
unconstitutional on this ground unless the coercive nature of an offer is 
unmistakably clear.”129 
   Nonetheless, although finding this line is extremely difficult in general, in 
this case, seven of the nine members of the Court concluded either that 
the Medicaid expansion condition “is surely beyond”130 the line or that 
“there can be no doubt” that the condition “crosses the line.”131  It is 
important to point out that this seven-person majority includes not only 
the five more-conservative Justices but also Justices Breyer and Kagan.132 
Although not unanimous, this decision of the five more-conservative 
Justices along with two more-liberal Justices represents a situation where 
there seems to be a reasonable consensus that an appropriate baseline 
could be established.  Using this baseline, the Court then draws a reasonable 
conclusion that a coercive line has been crossed due to the extreme nature 
of the threat implied by the Medicaid expansion condition.133 
 129.  Id. at 2662 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 130.  Id. at 2606 (majority opinion). 
 131.  Id. at 2662 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
132.  Although most of the criticisms of individual Justices’ votes in this case have 
been directed at Chief Justice Roberts, it is important to note that a number of 
commentators have also criticized Justice Kagan’s joining the Roberts opinion on the 
Medicaid issue.  See Josh Gerstein, Justice Elena Kagan: Overlooked Turncoat on Health 
Care Law?, POLITICO (July 5, 2012, 1:42 PM), http://www.politico.com/blogs/under-the-
radar/2012/07/justice-elena-kagan-overlooked-turncoat-on-health-128095.html (“‘Who knew 
that the Solicitor General thought the Medicaid expansion was unconstitutional?’ said Kevin 
Outterson . . . .  Asked how likely he thought it was prior to Thursday’s ruling that Kagan 
would wind up taking such a stance, Outterson said: ‘Never in my wildest nightmares.’”); 
Glenn Greenwald, Kagan’s Medicaid Vote, SALON (July 7, 2012, 3:22 AM), http://www. 
salon.com/2012/07/07/kagans_medicaid_vote/; Dahlia Lithwick, Where Is the Liberal 
Outrage?, SLATE (July 6, 2012, 4:38 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/ 
jurisprudence/2012/07/while_conservatives_are_furious_about_john_roberts_health_care_dec
ision_liberals_are_silent_about_the_defections_from_the_supreme_court_s_liberal_justices_.s 
ingle.html. 
 133.  See Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2603–04.  Another way to state this argument is as 
follows: given the magnitude of the Medicaid program, there should be no rational 
possibility that Congress would act to terminate it overnight.  Any threat to do so would 
be evidence of an irrational bargaining stance.  How might a bargaining counterparty 
respond to such an irrational threat?  If available, many counterparties would withdraw 
from bargaining.  However, if withdrawal is not possible, then a rational counterparty 
almost certainly would feel compelled to accept the offered condition or risk retaliation 
by a demonstrably irrational sovereign.  Just as in the text, this coercion argument 
depends on both the existence of a reasonably consensual baseline along with an extreme 
threat as measured from that baseline. 
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IV. GOING FORWARD: IS JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE SPENDING POWER
NEEDED, AND IF SO, AT WHAT LEVEL OF SCRUTINY? 
   The Court’s finding of coercion in this case leads to a number of 
questions about how far this logic will be extended.  There are a wide 
range of policies, from environmental and educational to social programs, 
where Congress has used its spending power to give incentives to states 
to follow federal preferences.  This case revives a previously dormant 
avenue for invalidating these incentives.  The question then becomes, to 
what extent will the Court apply coercion, or in other words, what level 
of scrutiny should the Court apply to these conditions? 
   This Article recommends that courts grant Congress great deference, 
even more deference than “rational basis” review,134 in examining whether 
a particular legislative condition imposed under its authority under the 
Spending Clause is coercive.  To use the language of the joint dissenters 
in Sebelius, the standard should be that it is “unmistakably clear”135 that 
the condition is coercive.  This is, by its nature, an extremely vague 
standard, but nonetheless, the significant deference represented by it is 
necessary to maintain a proper balance between the need for judicial 
checks on legislative power and the benefits from the separation of powers 
along with the efficiency of optimal federalism.  Only by maintaining this 
significant deference can we preserve opportunities to utilize optimal 
federalism approaches that enable us both to save critical resources and 
to achieve policy objectives that may not be obtained otherwise.  Before 
turning to the reasoning behind this level of scrutiny, let us review the 
need for judicial review of possibly coercive conditions. 
A.  The Need for Scrutiny of Spending Power Conditions 
   It is essential that courts review congressional conditions imposed on 
states under the spending power.  As noted in Sebelius and others, 
Congress’s authority under the Spending Clause extends beyond its other 
enumerated powers, supplemented by its authority under the Necessary 
and Proper Clause.136  Under our constitutional system, there must be some 
 134.  Some scholars refer to a slightly higher standard than rational basis review, for 
example, a “rational basis with bite.”  See, e.g., Scott A. Keller, Depoliticizing Judicial 
Review of Agency Rulemaking, 84 WASH. L. REV. 419, 425–27 (2009).  The standard 
proposed here goes the other direction. 
 135.  Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2662 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 136.  See supra text accompanying note 93. 
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check on this legislative power, and it must be the judiciary who provides 
that check.  Without that check, limits on Congress’s enumerated powers 
would have no meaning, as Congress could utilize its spending power 
to evade them at will.137  Congress also could commandeer the states 
at will, possibly eliminating the states’ role as “independent sovereigns,” the 
importance of which is signified by remembering that “freedom is 
enhanced by the creation of two governments, not one.”138 
   In addition to these constitutional principles, a judicial check on the 
spending power may also be needed to overturn inefficient legislation. 
Consider a simple example with a similar structure as that of the 
Medicaid condition from the Affordable Care Act: Let us say that 
Congress wishes to induce State A to perform Task 1 that will bring a 
benefit to the nation of $10.  If this were a situation of arms-length 
bargaining, in order to induce State A to do Task 1, Congress would 
have to promise State A something in return for doing Task 1 that would 
be worth more than State A’s net cost of performing Task 1.  Let us 
assume that State A’s private benefit is zero and that its cost of 
performing Task 1 is $12—performing this task would be inefficient 
because its cost is larger than its benefit.  Now, in order to induce State 
A to perform Task 1, Congress enacts legislation stating that if State A 
performs Task 1, Congress will reimburse $6 of State A’s cost of 
performing Task 1.  Additionally, the legislation states that if State A 
fails to perform Task 1, State A will not only lose the $6 payment but 
Congress will also take away a payment of $10 that Congress previously 
paid State A for performing Task 2.139  Faced with these congressional 
spending power conditions, how would State A respond? 
   The reader should recognize that, under these circumstances, State A 
will feel compelled to perform Task 1.  This is true, even though it would be 
inefficient to do so.  However, with numbers as clear as this, a court 
could easily find evidence of coercion such that this legislation could not 
be supported by the spending power.  Thus, this provides one example of 
how judicial review of the coerciveness of congressional spending power 
conditions could help ensure the efficiency of legislation. 
 137.  See Baker, supra note 63, at 1914. 
 138.  Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2602 (quoting Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 
2364 (2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  For more on the benefits of competition 
between federal and state governments, see Todd E. Pettys, Competing for the People’s 
Affection: Federalism’s Forgotten Marketplace, 56 VAND. L. REV. 329, 332–37 (2003). 
139.  Assume that State A gets no other private benefit from performing Task 2 and 
so that without this payment, State A would no longer perform Task 2. 
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B.  How Much Deference? 
   Now that we have seen that judicial review of coerciveness is needed 
for both constitutional and efficiency reasons, the next question is how 
much deference should the judiciary show Congress.  To determine this, 
we will examine constitutional, political theoretical, and pragmatic 
factors. 
1. Constitutional and Political Theoretical Factors
   To begin, one of the key components of the federal system designed by 
the Constitution is the notion of the separation of powers.  Within their 
specific realms, each branch of government should be afforded great 
deference.  This deference is explained in Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion in 
Sebelius.  He writes,  
Our permissive reading of these powers is explained in part by a general 
reticence to invalidate the acts of the Nation’s elected leaders.  “Proper respect 
for a coordinate branch of the government” requires that we strike down an Act 
of Congress only if “the lack of constitutional authority to pass [the] act in 
question is clearly demonstrated.”140 
   In addition, although the judiciary is well suited to guarantee procedural 
protections such as when it engages in “clear statement” analysis of 
spending power conditions, political theory suggests that the judiciary is 
ill suited to conduct narrow line-drawing exercises when baselines are not 
clear.141  This difficulty for the judiciary is seen across a wide range of 
policy issues, including redistricting,142 abortion rights,143 economic 
 140. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2579 (quoting United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 
635 (1883)). 
 141.  See Galle, supra note 72, at 197–98. 
 142.  See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 296 (2004) (“[E]ach of the last four steps 
requires a quantifying judgment that is unguided and ill suited to the development of 
judicial standards . . . .”); Duckworth v. State Admin. Bd. of Election Laws, 332 F.3d 
769, 777 (4th Cir. 2003). 
 143.  See Note, After Ayotte: The Need To Defend Abortion Rights with Renewed 
“Purpose,” 119 HARV. L. REV. 2552, 2560 & n.62 (2006) (“[C]ourts are especially ill-
suited to translate abstract rights into practice when this translation requires line-
drawing.” (citing Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 
COLUM. L. REV. 857, 861 (1999))). 
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regulation,144 the difference between male and female,145 and climate 
change.146 
   The example used in the previous subpart demonstrates the difficulties 
that the judiciary can face in conducting line-drawing analysis to determine 
the coerciveness of spending conditions.  In that example, there were a 
number of embedded assumptions.  One assumption was a clear articulation 
of a baseline: State A was already performing Task 2 and was being 
compensated a specific amount by Congress, $10.  Other assumptions 
involved the specific valuations of the costs and benefits of Tasks 1 and 
2 for State A, with that specific information provided to the court. 
A court trying to examine the coerciveness of a different spending condition 
would need to collect similar information.  Because of the difficulty in 
identifying baselines and in valuing benefits and costs used to conduct 
line drawing, a court should give significant deference to the political 
bodies making these choices. 
2. Pragmatic and Efficiency Factors: The Need To Preserve
Opportunities To Apply Optimal Federalism 
   Moreover, there are strong pragmatic efficiency reasons for granting 
significant deference.  One of the more troubling possibilities of 
overextending the Court’s finding of coercion in the Medicaid condition 
is that courts may use coercion as a means to impede beneficial applications 
of optimal federalism.  The optimal federalism framework has been used 
previously to analyze environmental, immigration, and health care 
policies.147  In each of these analyses, the optimal approach to carry out a 
particular policy was never completely at the federal level or completely 
 144.  See Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis 
of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 799 (2006) (“In matters 
such as economic regulation the courts believe they are ill-suited to play a vigorous 
oversight role and thus allow the coordinate branches of government wide latitude to 
determine the law.”). 
 145.  See Julie Debeljak, Parliamentary Sovereignty and Dialogue Under the 
Victorian Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities: Drawing the Line Between 
Judicial Interpretation and Judicial Law-Making, 33 MONASH U. L. REV. 9, 65 (2007) 
(“In so concluding, Lord Nicholls held that such an interpretation ‘would represent a 
major change in the law, having far-reaching ramifications’, raising issues that ‘are 
altogether ill-suited for determination by courts and court procedures’ but which are 
‘pre-eminently a matter for Parliament . . . .’” (quoting Bellinger v. Bellinger, [2003] 
UKHL 21, [37], [2003] 2 A.C. 467 (appeal taken from Eng.))). 
 146.  See Matthew Edwin Miller, Note, The Right Issue, the Wrong Branch: Arguments 
Against Adjudicating Climate Change Nuisance Claims, 109 MICH. L. REV. 257, 258–60 
(2010). 
 147.  See Thompson, supra note 13, at 237–38; Thompson, supra note 9, at 437–38. 
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at the state level.  Instead, the best approach was to utilize the combined 
resources of the federal, state, and sometimes local governments. 
   The optimal federalism approach identified when certain levels of 
government would be better to carry out certain tasks than others.  For 
example, the best approach for protecting endangered species148 was a 
complex combination of federal and state authority.  The federal 
government should be responsible for enacting national legislation to 
protect endangered species, “establishing baseline protection, coordinating 
rule development for multi-state species,”149 and “addressing the need to 
coordinate multi-state mitigation projects, and to provide oversight in 
order to ensure baseline protections.”150  On the other hand, “states should 
be responsible for determining rules for protection beyond baselines, and 
for collecting and managing data for protecting species,”151 along with 
having primary responsibility for enforcing endangered species policies.152 
   Immigration policy likewise should be carried out using the resources 
of the federal, state, and local governments.  Enactment of immigration 
policy should be carried out by the federal government, and “this legislation 
should focus on enactment issues as opposed to implementation issues. 
It should also use general revenue tax-funded transfers to compensate states 
that bear more of the education and health care costs of immigration.”153  
The federal government should also be responsible for “determining 
immigration procedures and database management.”154  However, the 
states collectively should be responsible for “determining the appropriate 
level of immigration . . . .  This determination requires the collection and 
interpretation of data from local labor markets, along with assessments 
of immigration needs to fulfill family reunification objectives—tasks 
where” states have resource advantages over the federal government.155  
Finally, all levels of government, and even nongovernmental agents, should 
be involved in the enforcement of immigration policy: 
 148.  Note that the Optimal Federalism Across Institutions article also examines 
environmental policies for protecting wetlands.  See Thompson, supra note 9, at 445–47. 
 149.  Id. at 468. 
 150.  Id. at 471. 
 151.  Id. at 468. 
 152.  See id. at 470. 
 153.  Thompson, supra note 13, at 255. 
 154.  Id. at 257. 
 155.  Id. at 257–58. 
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Certain aspects should be strictly federal: border patrol and conducting 
deportation hearings.  However, verification of employment eligibility initially 
should occur at the lowest level—the employer.  State agents who can utilize 
their local knowledge and long-term relationships with employers should 
oversee employer verification, leading to economies of scope. . . .  Meanwhile, 
local police should be authorized to check immigration status, but only the status of 
those accused of aggravated felonies or participating in drug trafficking. . . .  
[C]ommunity integration should be pursued vigorously at the state and local 
level.156 
   Finally, the optimal federalism framework has also been used to show 
that the current Medicaid program—a shining example of the cooperative 
federalism approach157—has been constructed in such a way as to 
efficiently utilize the comparative advantages of federal and state 
governments.  As noted, “The current process of enactment at both the 
federal and state levels enables Medicaid policy to benefit from both [a 
larger tax base] by allowing some funding of the programs at the federal 
level, and also from the flexibility of . . . allowing states to tailor their 
programs to their needs.”158  Meanwhile, “the primary responsibility for 
implementing and enforcing Medicaid policy is properly placed with 
state governments”159 because state governments have natural advantages 
“in negotiating with plans to provide [health care] services; in enrolling 
individual beneficiaries; and in collecting encounter data.”160 
   It should be noted here that this sharing of authority between federal 
and state governments embodied in the Medicaid program is accomplished 
via Congress’s authority under the Spending Clause.161  It is not implausible 
that a judge in a future case, challenging the entire Medicaid program, 
might apply the coercion rationale revived by Sebelius as a means for 
invalidating Medicaid.162  In response, the federal government might be 
forced to implement and enforce a similar program on its own, without 
access to state resources.  Such a program might be doomed to failure 
 156.  Id. at 262. 
 157.  See Abbe R. Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism and Statutory Interpretation: 
State Implementation of Federal Law in Health Reform and Beyond, 121 YALE L.J. 534, 
583–84 (2011); Nicole Huberfeld, Bizarre Love Triangle: The Spending Clause, Section 
1983, and Medicaid Entitlements, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 413, 419–20 (2008); Erin 
Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1, 62–63 (2011) (“The Medicaid program 
was initially designed as a classic spending power-based program of cooperative federalism 
. . . .”); Stephen Utz, Federalism in Health Care: Costs and Benefits, 28 CONN. L. REV. 
127, 129 (1995). 
 158.  Thompson, supra note 9, at 475. 
 159.  Id. at 480. 
 160.  Id. at 479–80. 
 161.  See Ryan, supra note 157, at 62–63. 
162.  A judge might also apply it to invalidate one of the other federal-state programs 
supported by Congress’s spending power.  See supra notes 6–8 and accompanying text. 
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and would at least be significantly more wasteful than the current Medicaid 
program.163 
   Thus, the revival of the coercion rationale for invalidating conditions 
placed on states by Congress under its spending power opens the door to 
the possibility that Medicaid itself, or one of the other programs designed to 
take advantage of optimal federalism efficiencies, might be ruled 
unconstitutional.  Such a ruling could make certain public policies infeasible 
to fully implement and enforce and would certainly greatly increase the 
costs of other policies, as we would lose the benefits of an optimal 
federalism approach.  Mindful of these pragmatic and efficiency reasons, 
in addition to the constitutional and political theoretical reasons discussed 
above, judges should be cautioned to grant significant deference to 
Congress when examining whether a spending power condition is coercive. 
C.  What Level of Scrutiny? 
   Now that we see the need for a significant amount of deference, the 
final question we need to answer is, what level of scrutiny should be 
applied?  Judicial review of congressional legislation is typically thought 
of as occurring at three different “tiers of scrutiny.”164  The three tiers are 
“strict scrutiny,” “intermediate scrutiny,” and “‘rational basis’ review,” with 
the most deferential of these being rational basis review.165  At each tier, 
“courts . . . analyze the means and the ends of legislation by asking whether 
the governmental purpose rises to the requisite level (the ends) and 
whether the legislation has the requisite connection to that purpose (the 
means).”166  Rational basis review “merely requires that the legislation 
ha[ve] a legitimate governmental purpose and [be] rationally related to that 
purpose,” which can be “any conceivable, hypothetical governmental 
purpose that the legislature could have had in mind.”167 
   One might think that a deferential court should apply rational basis 
review to determine whether a spending condition is coercive.  However, 
 163.  It will be wasteful because it will not have access to the state government’s 
more efficient resources for implementation and enforcement. 
 164.  Keller, supra note 134, at 459. 
 165.  Id. at 460. 
 166.  Id. at 459.  For an example of the application of means-ends analysis to examine 
takings jurisprudence, see James E. Holloway & Donald C. Guy, Weighing the Need To 
Establish Regulatory Takings Doctrine To Justify Takings Standards of Review and 
Principles, 34 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 315 (2010). 
 167.  Keller, supra note 134, at 460 (emphasis omitted). 
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the problem of applying rational basis review in this setting is the notion 
that the government purpose must be “legitimate.”  As discussed above, 
it is difficult to define the boundaries of what is legitimate in the context 
of Congress’s authority under the Spending Clause. 
   Another problem with rational basis review is the discretion it leaves 
to individual judges in deciding whether there is a rational connection 
between the means and the ends.  We can see this difficulty in Justice 
Brennan’s dissent in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission.168  In Penn 
Central Transportation Co. v. New York City,169 Justice Brennan, writing 
for the majority, applied a rational basis standard to assess the validity of 
New York’s Landmarks Preservation Law.170  In his dissent in Nollan, 
Justice Brennan returned to the rational basis standard: “It is also by now 
commonplace that this Court’s review of the rationality of a State’s 
exercise of its police power demands only that the State ‘could rationally 
have decided’ that the measure adopted might achieve the State’s 
objective.”171  Brennan then criticized Justice Scalia’s majority opinion 
as having a too “narrow conception of rationality”172: 
The Court finds fault with this measure because it regards the condition as 
insufficiently tailored to address the precise type of reduction in access 
produced by the new development.  The Nollans’ development blocks visual 
access, the Court tells us, while the Commission seeks to preserve lateral access 
along the coastline.  Thus, it concludes, the State acted irrationally.  Such a 
narrow conception of rationality, however, has long since been discredited as a 
judicial arrogation of legislative authority.  “To make scientific precision a 
criterion of constitutional power would be to subject the State to an intolerable 
supervision hostile to the basic principles of our Government.”173 
Brennan here suggested that, in his view, rationality is quite broad, broad 
enough to allow a connection between the means of providing lateral 
access to the beach as a substitute for the end of protecting the public’s 
view of the beach.  To Brennan, the ability of someone to use the easement 
across the Nollan’s property to move closer to the beach and then see the 
entire beach would be enough to establish a rational connection between the 
means and the ends.  However, to Justice Scalia, such a connection is 
“quite impossible to understand.”174  Therefore, even with as deferential 
168.  483 U.S. 825, 842–64 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
169.  438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
 170.  See id. at 131 (“[D]ecisions sustaining other land-use regulations, which, like 
the New York City law, are reasonably related to the promotion of the general welfare . . . .”). 
 171.  Nollan, 483 U.S. at 843 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Minnesota v. Clover 
Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 466 (1981)). 
 172.  Id. at 846. 
 173.  Id. at 845–46 (quoting Sproles v. Binford, 286 U.S. 374, 388 (1932)). 
 174.  Id. at 838 (majority opinion). 
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of a standard as rational basis review, courts must necessarily apply their 
own standard of rationality to assess the connection between the means 
and the ends.  Consequently, in order to assess the coerciveness of spending 
conditions, we might want to consider a standard that grants Congress 
even more deference. 
   The Court in Sebelius seems to recognize the need for an even more 
deferential standard in reviewing congressional authority under the 
Spending Clause.  As noted above, because members of the judiciary 
“possess neither the expertise nor the prerogative to make policy 
judgments,” the standard that Chief Justice Roberts would apply is that 
coerciveness of a spending condition must be “clearly demonstrated.”175  
As also described above, Justice Ginsburg likewise noted, “[t]his Court, 
time and again, has respected Congress’ prescription of spending 
conditions.”176  Ginsburg further reminded us that the judiciary is ill suited 
to examine the coerciveness of conditions: “The coercion inquiry, therefore, 
appears to involve political judgments that defy judicial calculation.”177 
Even the joint dissenters seem to recognize the need for a standard that is 
even more deferential than rational basis, as they explain that the judiciary 
“should not conclude that legislation is unconstitutional on this ground 
unless the coercive nature of an offer is unmistakably clear.”178 
   This standard, that coercion must be “unmistakably clear,” seems to be 
the appropriate one.  This standard would expand our tiers of scrutiny to 
a fourth, even more deferential category.  Although it does not provide a 
bright line, in the case of coercion, bright lines rarely exist.  On the other 
hand, this standard does allow the Court to provide some check on 
congressional power, when it is unmistakably clear that a condition has 
crossed the fuzzy line into coercion.  At the same time though, this standard 
also offers significant deference to congressional Spending Clause 
authority, which is justified by constitutional, political theoretical, pragmatic, 
and efficiency reasons.  A condition that might be narrowly considered as 
perhaps coercive will remain valid; only when the coercion is unmistakably 
clear will the Court invalidate it. 
 175.  Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2579 (2012) (quoting 
United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 635 (1883)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 176.  Id. at 2633 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. 
Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981)). 
 177.  Id. at 2641. 
 178.  Id. at 2662 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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D.  How Would a Court Apply an “Unmistakably Clear”          
Coercion Standard? 
   Although an unmistakably clear standard might seem vague, there is 
still some practical structure to support it.  There are two factors that a 
court would need to apply in determining whether a spending power 
condition is coercive: (1) there must exist some reasonably consensual 
baseline for comparison, and (2) the condition must then have such an 
extreme effect that it is unmistakably clear that the condition crosses a 
somewhat fuzzy line into coercion. 
   To see how this standard would be applied, let us use it to assess the 
coerciveness of the Medicaid expansion condition in the Affordable Care 
Act.  This analysis will be similar as that conducted by the Court itself. 
   To apply an unmistakably clear standard, a court should begin by 
determining whether there is a reasonably consensual baseline.  If no 
consensual baseline exists, the court should stop and uphold the condition. 
However, if one can be found, the court should identify it and then 
proceed to the next step.  In this case, although Justice Ginsburg argues 
that there could be an alternative baseline in which Congress could “wipe 
out” Medicaid, in practical terms, Medicaid will continue.  Consequently, a 
reasonable baseline for examining the Medicaid expansion condition 
would be a state’s participation in the existing Medicaid program. 
   The next step is to examine whether the condition itself is unmistakably 
clearly coercive.  To do this, the court should examine the effects on the 
state of the conditional task required by Congress and also examine the 
effects of what the condition itself would impose on the state if it chose 
not to perform that task.  It should examine these effects in reference to the 
baseline established in the prior step.  After examining these effects, the 
court should balance them to weigh whether the condition would impose 
an unmistakably clearly coercive impact. 
   For the Medicaid expansion condition, initially, the fiscal effects on a 
state would be mild: the federal government would reimburse the state at 
a one hundred percent rate through 2016 and gradually reduce that to a 
still-high ninety percent rate.179  However, this reimbursement funding 
must come from somewhere, and the state could expect that its citizens 
would face higher federal taxes as a result.  On the other hand, if the 
state chose not to expand Medicaid as required by the Act, then the state 
would face the loss of its entire prior Medicaid reimbursement, which it 
would have received under the established baseline.  This loss would be 
catastrophic for the state because, as the Court noted above, “Medicaid 
spending accounts for over 20 percent of the average State’s total budget, 
179.  Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(y)(1) (Supp. IV 2010). 
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with federal funds covering 50 to 83 percent of those costs.”180  The 
threat of a loss of over ten percent of a state’s annual budget for failure 
to comply with this condition seems quite excessive and as the Court 
concluded, “surely [went] beyond”181 the line into “unmistakably clear” 
coercion.  As the reader can see, although this analysis does require a vague 
determination of when coercion is unmistakably clear, it does provide 
some guideposts for examining the condition, while embedding significant 
deference for congressional spending conditions.  This new standard for 
judicial review of Congress’s authority under the Spending Clause should 
therefore maintain optimal federalism opportunities for efficiently allocating 
policy responsibilities between different levels of government. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
   This Article proposes a new tier of scrutiny, unmistakably clear, for 
conducting judicial review of congressional authority under the Spending 
Clause.  Under this standard, a condition would be unconstitutional only 
if it is unmistakably clear that it is coercive.  Courts applying this standard 
will grant Congress significant deference, even more than rational basis 
review.  Nonetheless, this standard does provide some limits to 
congressional authority, limits that were crossed by the Affordable Care 
Act’s Medicaid expansion condition.  On the other hand, the level of 
deference inherent in the unmistakably clear standard will allow Congress 
to continue to seek opportunities where a cooperative, optimal federalism 
approach can lead to innovative solutions to complex policy problems in 
a flexible and low-cost manner. 
   In order to develop this proposal, this Article traces the debate over the 
spending power from the Federalist Papers up through the decision in 
Sebelius, finding strong arguments for granting significant deference to 
Congress’s Spending Clause authority.  Meanwhile, careful analysis of the 
different opinions in Sebelius yields not only the name for the new standard 
of review—from the joint dissenters—but also the technique for conducting 
it.  Just as was done in this case, courts applying the unmistakably clear 
standard of review must first find a reasonably consensual policy baseline. 
Courts must then weigh different factors deriving from a spending power 
condition in reference to that baseline to determine whether it is 
 180.  Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2604. 
 181.  Id. at 2606. 
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unmistakably clear that the condition is so excessive that it must be 
considered coercive. 
   The purpose of this Article in defining this new standard of review is 
to urge future courts not to overextend the application of coercion as a 
means of invalidating congressional spending conditions.  For a long 
time, it seemed as though there were no practical means of invalidating a 
spending condition, to the point that some wondered whether the 
enumeration of congressional powers would have no limiting effect on 
the ultimate authority of Congress.  The Court in Sebelius put an end to 
this leniency by finding the Medicaid extension condition coercive, a 
correct result under the unmistakably clear standard. 
   Now though, we may face the danger of the pendulum swinging too 
far in the other direction, as courts may become overzealous in finding 
coercion in many other policies.  Doing so may jeopardize the ability of 
federal, state, and local governments to work together to solve pressing 
policy problems.  The optimal federalism framework shows how such 
cooperative approaches can deliver respectful and innovative outcomes 
that save valuable social resources.  These solutions and resources may 
be lost if cooperative policies are inappropriately invalidated as being 
coercive. 
   In order to maintain a balanced perspective, courts should apply the 
unmistakably clear standard to their review of congressional spending 
power conditions.  Doing so will enable courts to define appropriate limits 
to congressional authority under the Spending Clause and at the same 
time, will permit federal, state, and local governments to solve public policy 
problems in a cooperative, optimal federalism manner. 
